9 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
20959 | Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher] |